Nov. 24

Busy week folks, I’ve been pretty tied up with work and pulling my hair out over the reserves. More to come on that after this weekend.



AFGHANISTAN



Not a lot new on the Afghanistan front. Aside from the irony of accepting the Nobel Prize while explaining escalating a current war, not a lot new has come out. The preliminary assertion that we would pull out starting in 2011 and finish in 2013 has been muddied several time with follow up pseudo-clarifications that “the withdrawal is based on conditions on the ground”, and that it will be gradual.



http://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-fg-gates-afghanistan7-2009dec07,0,5275244.story



It will be interesting in a few years to see who wins the next round of debates over force levels in Afghanistan. There are enormous hurdles to achieving success in Afghanistan. The biggest one I have seen recently is that Taliban foot soldiers are better paid than Afghani police and Army troops, due to the massive influx of opium related funds to the Taliban, according to Gen McChrystal in his testimony to Congress this week. Additionally, the Army and police recruits we are dealing with are corrupt, drug addicted, unreliable, illiterate, and poorly trained. At least the Taliban prohibits its people from using drugs.



http://afghanistan.blogs.cnn.com/2009/12/09/taliban-pay-vs-afghan-forces-pay/

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,579986,00.html



It is not often you see a good Red Cell style article in public. This one caught my eye this week as being an excellent think piece on what the Taliban’s next few moves will be, and how their strategy should evolve in the face of recent developments. The author is well versed in the culture, but does seem to have an axe to grind.



http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2009/12/08/walid-phares-taliban-afghanistan-obama-al-qaeda/



We should hope our CENTCOM information operations campaign analysts are reading this. What we do should be designed to directly counter this line of attack if we are to have any chance of success.



Another notable development was Amb. Eikenberry and Gen McChrystal appearing before Congress and expressing their unity and friendship.



http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKN08191123._CH_.2420



Given what happened with McChrystal’s request earlier this year, and given Sen. McCain’s public concerns over the issue of the unity of DoD and DoS efforts in Afghanistan, it seems likely that both the Ambassador and the General were told to bury the hatchet, at the very least publicly. Gen. McChrystal is already in the hot seat for causing discomfort to the administration of his leaked report and comments about the state of the war.





IRAN



The Situation in Iran has been heating up in the last few days. The U.S. and our NATO allies in the UN (UK, France, and Germany) have become increasingly frustrated with Iran and are now promising “further sanctions.” Russia and China are, of course, not so hot on the idea and are asking for more time for existing sanctions to work. Given Iran’s flaunting of existing sanctions, one should be suspicious of the effectiveness of any sanctions, regardless of severity. Note the recent illegal arms shipments to Hezbollah in the second article, in violation of UN sanctions.



http://ca.news.yahoo.com/s/capress/091210/world/iran_nuclear_51

http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/12/10/iran.nuclear/index.html



SecDef Gates acknowledged the military option, but reflected current thinking that conventional strikes targeting Iranian nuclear facilities would only set them back 2-3 years. Thus, he supports further sanctions. This is the conventional wisdom in most military circles, and does not represent any sort of outside the box thinking.



http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/12/11/gates-predicts-significant-sanctions-iran/?test=latestnews



Current thinking is correct, if only in a vacuum. The social situation in Iran is taking a distinct turn for the worse.



http://www.iranfocus.com/en/iran-general-/in-iran-protests-gaining-a-radical-tinge-19252.html



The students are a large portion of the population. They’re also mostly military aged males. They’re at the point where many are demanding revolution, not reform. The Basiji are typically undereducated and lower class. Basically, if you’re big, dumb, fanatically religious, unemployed, and like to hit people with heavy objects, the Basiji always has an opening for you. Needless to say, the students aren’t particularly thrilled that their knuckle dragging countrymen get to call the shots, and are in fact systematically beating, torturing, raping, and killing protestors. The only thing propping up the regime in Iran it the moment is the Revolutionary Guard and the Basiji. However, given how the balance of power stands now, they are an insurmountable obstacle.



Given the Iranian economy’s reliance on oil, the regular military’s dislike of the Revolutionary Guard, and the Basiji being a dumping ground for chronically unemployed men, there is the very real possibility that a strike on Iran’s oil infrastructure would set off a brutal civil war. Much of the Basiji would likely melt away as their pay either evaporated or became worthless due to hyperinflation (if the government chose to print money to make payroll). Students would rise up. The revolutionary guard would be called in. The regular military, so long shunted aside in favor of their radical countrymen, might choose this moment to side with the students and attempt to prevent a massacre.



Seem unrealistic? This is basically how the Romanian regime fell in 1989. Except, in Iran’s case, security forces might choose to fight rather than step aside at the last minute. If a civil war erupts in Iran, the nuclear program is likely to be set back much more than 2-3 years. It could be decades. Additionally, if a softer revolution occurs (like that of Romania) with a new government in place, Iran might be willing to accept a deal for nuclear power much like the one recently rejected by Khameini and Ahmadinejad.