Weekly Intel Update for 4 MAR 2010

Sorry that I missed a week here. Hopefully the goodies in this week’s batch make up for it.

Iran

This blog tries to remain politically neutral, but some recent poll results makes it clear that the authors opinion are reflective of one particular viewpoint.

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/03/02/fox-news-poll-iran-bomb-equals-disaster/

“A Fox News poll released Tuesday finds that 60 percent of voters think force will be required to stop Iran, while 25 percent think diplomacy and sanctions alone will work.

Just over half of Democrats (51 percent) and independents (51 percent) think force will be necessary, as do three-quarters of Republicans (75 percent).

If Iran were to obtain the capability to use nuclear weapons, 56 percent think that would be “a disaster,” while 37 percent call it “a problem that can be managed” and 3 percent say it wouldn’t be a problem at all.

Despite a slim majority of Democrats thinking it would be a disaster (51 percent), a large minority think it would be a problem that could be managed (42 percent). In stark contrast, Republicans -- by a wide 36 point margin -- think Iran with nukes would be a disaster (60 percent).”

My first thought upon reading this was that the poll was interviewing the wrong people: they should have been polling Israelis because the US government has already made it clear that the military option is off the table. However, here’s a brief list of questions that need to be answered by the people who believe negotiations will work, and / or that a nuclear Iran is a problem that can be managed.

1. If Iran becomes a nuclear power, can Israeli actions be managed? Given the Israeli history of unpredictability and sudden, violent unilateral action, plus the frosty relations between Israel and the U.S. at the moment, this seems unlikely. U.S. control is limited when they perceive an existential threat (Six Day War), and previous strikes at Syrian and Iraqi nuclear facilities illustrates they really don’t care what the rest of the world thinks.

2. Can the consequences of Israeli military action be managed? If Iran takes it on the chin from Israel, and Iran retains a capability to retaliate, they can wreak havoc on other Gulf states’ oil production and distribution operations. There’s no way we can stop the damage to the economy this will cause.

3. Why would you think diplomacy would work? We’ve been negotiating with Iran in multi-party talks since 2005. In that time, the Iranian position has not changed a whit, and their program has marched forward completely unimpeded (except by covert Israeli actions). Also consider the 15 years of negotiations with North Korea over their nuclear weapons program, and the success it has enjoyed.

4. What makes you think you can get sanctions past China? China is Iran’s #1 trade partner, and in return China is getting lots of cheap oil, and slowly sending its tendrils into the Iranian oil production infrastructure. China has so far shown no inclination to alter its position.

http://www.iranfocus.com/en/nuclear/china-says-pushing-for-diplomatic-solution-on-iran-19848.html

5. Even if you get sanctions past China, will they be strong enough to have the desired effect? If China agrees to sanctions, it will only agree to weak ones which do not interfere with its trade with Iran. This seems to be a likely option, since it allows the other nations to declare diplomatic victory, go home, and ignore the problem for another couple of years while stating “we need to give sanctions a chance to work”. Too bad Iran will have a weapon in as little as 18 months.

6. Even if you do (somehow) get very strong sanctions through, what makes you think they would work? Sudan weathered sanctions amidst Darfur. Saddam Hussein got filthy rich off the black market for his oil during the 12 years of sanctions between 1991 and 2003. Iran has been sanctioned for years with targeted sanctions, and it has barely slowed down their nuclear program. They’re still acquiring weapons and nuclear related materials with relative ease (and distributing them to their proxies in Gaza and Lebanon). North Korea has been under sanctions for years. During the famine of 1995-1998, 2.5 to 3 million North Koreans died of starvation (10% of the North Korean population). Compare this with the Ethiopian famine of 1984-1985 where 1 million people died (less than 3% ). North Korea’s nuclear program continued right through this. The moral of this is that even if you imposed sanctions on Iran that were so strong you killed off 10% of the country, there’s still no reason to believe it would actually stop their nuclear program, based on historical evidence. http://www.iranfocus.com/en/terrorism/italy-arrests-seven-for-smuggling-arms-to-iran-19847.html

This is not to be partisan, but merely to look at this as logically as possible. Iran wants nuclear weapons, and the evidence strongly suggests that options other than force have a very low (close to zero) probability of succeeding.

This next article confirms earlier speculation that we will not see sanctions until this June at the earliest.

http://ca.news.yahoo.com/s/afp/100301/usa/iran_nuclear_politics_us_sanctions

Once again, the question this begs is not what will the G5+1 do or how they will react, but how will it affect the other actor sitting on the sidelines who has everything on the line. What message does it send? How will it be received? Odds are, Israel will wait until what it regards as the last possible instant (based on intelligence) to make it’s move. That would push the timeframe out to 18-36 months (at the latest).

Pakistan

Pakistan has been fighting militants more effectively now than at any time since 9/11.

http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/03/04/pakistan.militants/index.html?iref=allsearch

http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/03/02/pakistan.taliban.commanders.killed/index.html?iref=allsearch

What’s significant here is that the Pakistani army fought back, didn’t retreat, and inflicted heavy casualties. Will to fight has always been an issue. The bigger one has been the ISI.

http://afghanistan.blogs.cnn.com/2010/03/03/whatever-happened-to-bin-laden/

Some analysts believe that the Pakistani intelligence service (ISI) knows where bin Laden is, and are holding out on us because as long as he’s out there, Pakistan can keep milking the U.S. for military aid and support against India.

In a bit of good news, the Pakistanis locals have evicted al Qaeda from its stronghold on the border. Given the scope of these tunnels, and how much stuff they left behind in their hurry to escape, this is a good thing.

http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/Afghanistan/network-150-al-qaeda-caves-captured-afghan-border/story?id=10000854

1. If you leave in a hurry, you’re probably not moving to a better hiding spot. This means we’ll have better opportunities to catch or kill some of these guys as they scurry for cover.

2. There’s plenty of intelligence to be had here. We’ll find stuff. Don’t think for a moment that the CIA won’t go all CSI on this stuff given an opportunity (what kind of pollen is on the blankets? What sort of DNA can we recover? How old are the cells we recovered? Who do they belong to? What kind of minerals / mud are on the equipment? Did they leave behind documents? Computers? Storage media? Who made the weapons? When? What about fingerprints on the weapons? If we catch someone later, and want to figure out if they’re al Qaeda affiliates, we’ll have the goods in our database.)

The bad news? The locals say the foreigners are fleeing to Yemen and Somalia rather than back across the Pakistan / Afghanistan border.


Terrorism

A noted Islamic scholar produced what is considered the most thoroughly researched Fatwa against suicide attacks to date.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/35660866/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asia/

Some would argue this is a significant step. However I think it will have a minimal effect. Islamic extremism and violence is probably more a cultural function than a religious one. In fact, I would regard violent Islamic ideology as more of a catalyst than as a cause. It provides a convenient excuse to behave in a way in which you were already inclined. There’s no argument that Turkish Muslims tend to be very different from Arabic ones, or Malaysians, or Pakistanis. There’s a darned good reason why most of the big terrorist acts of the past decade came from a handful of countries, and almost exclusively from one self identified cultural group. (We’ll leave the answer to the reader). Note that the author of this Fatwa does not come from the same cultural background as the majority of suicide bombers.

Israel

A few weeks ago, the center-left Brookings institution ran a war game that simulated what would happen if Israel attacked Iran's nuclear facilities. What it found was that things spun out of control afterwards, and everyone but Iran really suffered in the aftermath.

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/02/21/87061/war-game-shows-how-attacking-iran.html

All I can say to this is...all right, all right, we get it. A conventional strike by Israel only makes things worse. A couple of months ago another war game reached similar conclusions. The problem is, none of these think tanks is thinking outside the box.

Israel certainly pays attention to these war games. They certainly have their own. Their intelligence on Iran surpasses our own, frankly (we had no idea Syria was building a nuclear facility until after the Israelis blew it up). So, why on earth would Israel mount a conventional strike if it would only set Iran's nuclear program back a little bit, and might fail entirely? Why would they do what everyone expects them to do? Why would they telegraph their punches? Why would they mount their attacks the same way they attacked Syria and Iraq's facilities? All of these would cede the element of strategic surprise.

What I want to know is why in a room full of PhD's would none of them stop to ask: If Israel believes a conventional strike will not help their situation, sanctions and diplomacy are doomed to fail, and a nuclear armed Iran is unacceptable, what will they do instead? If you accept these premises, then the remaining option is something unconventional. Somehow, despite these reasonable assumptions of Israeli thought processes, none of our think tank experts has reached this conclusion, has chosen to war game it, or discus it openly.